INTRODUCTION

Motor reaction priming by masked stimuli
Numerous studies have shown that responses to stimuli that are preceded by subliminal (i.e., not consciously reportable) stimuli are affected by specific features of the subliminal stimuli. In the classical experiments by Neumann and Klotz (1994) a target display was used consisting of two figures, a square and a diamond, in which either the square or the diamond appeared to the left or right of fixation. One of the figures was defined as the target, which required a left or right key press depending on its side relative to fixation. The other nontarget figure was a distractor. The target display was preceded by a prime display, which consisted of two shapes which were small replicas of the diamond and square. This prime display was made unrecognizable by metacontrast masking induced by the target display. Results showed that responses were speeded up when the side of the target-like replica in the prime display corresponded with the side of the target in nal primes invoked the preparation of the motor action specified by their form, that is compatible primes activated the required motor action whereas incompatible primes activated an erroneous motor action. This notion seems to be supported by EEG data. Specifically, motor activation evoked by masked, unidentifiable primes has been observed in the lateralized readiness potential, with target-like replicas in prime displays evoking activity corresponding to the associated response in the contralateral motor cortex Leuthold & Kopp, 1998) . Thus, it may be proposed that the response delay on incompatible trials is caused by the suppression of inadequate motor actions triggered by the prime. We will first focus on this hypothesis.
Direct parameter specification
The direct parameter specification (DPS) hypothesis originally proposed by Neumann (1990) was invoked by Neumann and Klotz (1994) to explain the subliminal priming of motor actions. According to DPS, "input information specifies action parameters without (or at least before) giving rise to a corresponding mental representation as a necessary prerequisite" (Neumann, 1990; p. 212) . In a more recent paper (Neumann, Ansorge, & Klotz, 1998) , it is stated that once an action plan is completed, sensory information can be used to specify free parameters of the responses without mediating conscious perception. Nevertheless, the specified parameters may sometimes need to be corrected off-line when something goes wrong (Jaśkowski et al., 2003) . An important consideration is the idea that DPS only occurs when the prime resembles the target. Accordingly, Ansorge, Heumann, and Scharlau (2002) claimed that the priming effect diminished when figures in the prime were made dissimilar to the target. Hence, response preparation evoked by subliminal primes requires feature overlap between the prime and the target display.
Interestingly, recent work has related DPS to attentional orienting, proposing that DPS may be involved in the control of attention and choice responses alike.
Specifically, it has been argued that attention is unconsciously captured by the prime when it matches features of the target (e.g., see Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003) . In some specific settings, however, DPS may only be a part of the explanation. For example, in a few subliminal priming experiments (e.g. Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Jaśkowski et al., 2003) primes may have exerted their effects because the target-like replica in the prime automatically attracted attention due to its high salience. These two different possibilities will be fleshed out in the following section.
The possible influence of attentional capture
Attention is known to be effectively captured by the abrupt onset of a stimulus. For example, in a study by Posner and Cohen (1984) , to-be-detected targets, presented left or right from fixation, were preceded by uninformative peripheral cues to the left or right. Reaction times (RTs) were shorter when the target occurred on the side of the peripheral cue than when it occurred on the other, uncued side; a result that is ascribable to attentional capture by the peripheral cue. Miller (1989) showed that this effect also occurs when abrupt offsets are used, suggesting that attention can be captured by any abrupt changes such as onsets or offsets (cf. Franconeri, Simons, & Junge, 2004) . Theeuwes (1992; 2004) additionally provided evidence that stimuli with unique and salient features (e.g., a red item among blue ones) or so-called singletons can automatically capture attention. This form of attentional capture, guided by discontinuities in the environment, has been labeled bottom-up or exogenous attentional orienting, to signify that this attentional capture is automatic and not dependent on intentions. Indeed, in some studies it was shown that attention may be captured by abrupt onsets in the environment even when the relevant target location is already indicated by a preceding, 100% valid cue (e.g., van der Lubbe & Postma, 2005, but see Theeuwes, 1991) 1 . Importantly, in some experiments, exogenous orienting may provide an alternative explanation for the priming effect, without the requirement of DPS. In the following this view will be denoted as bottomup attentional capture. We will focus on an example from Jaśkowski et al. 's experiments (2003) . In their experiments, stimuli consisted of two square outlines placed to the left and right of fixation (see Fig. 1 ).
The intact outline was defined as the distractor, and the outline with 3-mm gaps to the left and right was defined as the target. The target display was preceded by a sequence of four stimuli: one prime display in which the target-like replica was displayed on the same side as, or the opposite side to, the target and http://www.ac-psych.org three filler displays (pairs of intact outlines). Thus, the target-like replica was embedded in a stream of homogeneous figures. Due to this homogeneity the target-like replica may have acted as a singleton, thereby automatically attracting attention, which may have invoked a larger priming effect. Indeed, in Jaśkowski et al.'s study, the priming effect was larger than in other experimental settings (100 ms vs. 10 to 70 ms in other studies: Kunde, 2003; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998; Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005; Mattler, 2003; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2002) , which may be due to the contribution of bottom-up attentional capture.
Alternatively, attentional capture may also be understood from the perspective of DPS, as attention may be captured by the prime when it contains features that match features of the target (e.g., see Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003) . This view will be denoted as top-down attentional capture. Highly relevant for this conception is the top-down view of attentional capture forwarded by Folk, Leber, and Egeth (2002) . They stated: "there is growing evidence that the efficient allocation of visual selective attention involves a delicate interplay between the properties of the stimulus itself and the behavioral goals of the observer". In their seminal study, Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) showed that irrelevant abrupt onsets only captured attention when the target also had an abrupt onset. When the target was defined by a unique color, abrupt onsets no longer affected performance. By the same token, an abrupt change of the color of a target letter in a visual search task did not improve performance (Gibson & Jiang, 1998) , and a cue was more effective in capturing attention when its color matched one of the possible target colors (Ansorge & Heumann, 2003) . Thus, combining DPS with the view on attentional capture by Folk et al. (2002; 1992) leads to the following proposal: Attention is attracted to the location of the target-like replica in the prime display due to featural overlap with the target, which facilitates the processing of the subsequent target when it occurs on the same side. Moreover, according to Folk et al. (2002; 1992) , attentional capture is always contingent on target features, which implies that pure bottom-up effects do not really exist.
Although attentional capture may be involved, either in a pure bottom-up manner or in a more top-down manner, it may be questioned whether subliminal stimuli can actually capture attention. McCormick (1997) , however, provided an affirmative answer to this question. He showed that invisible peripheral cues still had a significant effect on RT to targets displays (rendering RTs longer or shorter depending on cue validity). 
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli used in the experiments were similar to those used by Jaśkowski et al. (2003) . Three kinds of squares, either with intact outlines, or with 3-mm gaps to the left and right or 3-mm gaps at the top and bottom, were employed. Displays consisted of two squares placed to the left and to the right of fixation.
In every trial, five displays were presented one after another. The square in each successive display was a slightly larger copy of the previous one (although the gaps were identical in all displays), thereby invoking metacontrast masking. Squares of the first display subtended 1.2 x 1.2°, increasing to 2.9 x 2.9° in the final display (Fig. 1) . The center of each square was placed 1.6° to the left or to the right of fixation.
The first four displays were each presented for 7 ms (12 ms in Exp. 1). The onset asynchrony between each http://www.ac-psych.org Blandyna Skalska, Piotr Jaśkowski, and Rob H. J. van 
Statistical analysis
Identification
As the identification ability of individual participants differed markedly, we decided to report data for all participants irrespective of their performance in the PI task and to show separately the data for participants who performed at chance level in the PI task (see Appendix). Importantly, the pattern of results was independent of whether the analyses included data of all or only the selected participants. Correlations between the priming effect and PCI were nonsignificant in Experiment 1 and 2, and significant only in Experiment 3. The neutral condition in which no singleton was flashed in a prime display was provided only for illustrative purposes and was not included in the statistical analysis.
Reaction times and error rates
Mean RTs from correct responses and error rates were statistically evaluated with repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs). When appropriate, Huynh-Feldt adjustments to the degrees of freedom were performed. We report whether p values were below .05, or even lower than .001.
EXPERIMENT 1
Our first experiment aimed to test whether a subliminal priming effect can be successfully evoked by a target-like replica in the prime display when it contains no salient features. Although it was not the case in the original procedure by Neumann and Klotz, in some experiments, the prime is not only similar to the target but also possesses a salient feature (Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Jaśkowski et al., 2003; Miśkiewicz, Skalska, & Jaśkowski, 2002; Skalska, Gierszewska, Miłkowska, Okulicz, & Jaśkowski, 2004) . As a con- In our experiment, we changed the instruction by asking participants to react to the side of the intact square rather than to the square with gaps. This required the target-like replica to be displayed seven times in the priming sequence and the salient distractor (a square with gaps on its vertical sides) only once (we refer to it as the prime display). If bottom-up attentional capture plays a key role in the priming effect, then reactions should be facilitated when the distractor occurs on the side of the target (i.e., with incompatible target displays). According to the topdown attentional capture account, however, reactions should be facilitated when the distractor occurs on the non-target side (i.e., with compatible target displays).
Method
Participants
Eighteen students took part in the experiment.
Stimuli and procedure
The intact square was defined as the target, and the square with gaps was defined as the distractor. Thus, each target display was preceded by three target-like replica pairs (filler displays) and one prime pair consisting of a target-like replica and a distractor (Fig. 1) .
A trial was defined as compatible when the target in the target display and the target-like replica in the prime display were on the same side. This implies that the same sequence of stimuli in the current study and in Experiment 1 of Jaśkowski et al. (2003) http://www.ac-psych.org are considered as compatible or incompatible, but that they differ with regard to the side of the target.
Each display was presented for 12 ms, but the target display was presented for 106 ms. The critical prime was displayed with one of four possible stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs; 140, 105, 70, and 35 ms).
For each of nine possible conditions (compatibility x SOA plus one neutral condition) 40 trials were presented.
In each trial of the prime identification part, two sequences of stimuli were presented: one with and one without the distractor in the priming sequence.
Participants had to indicate which one contained the distractor. In total, 160 trials were presented.
Results
Identification
Eight out of 18 persons chose the stimuli that contained the distractor better than may be expected on the basis of chance. However, the correlation between the priming effect and PCI was not statistically significant for any of the four SOA conditions; r values ranged from -0.4 to 0.1 and ps from 0.09 to 0.9. Possibly, this higher PCI is partially caused by learning during the prime identification test. Being well motivated, our participants may have used the correctness feedback to improve their effectiveness at guessing (see also Schubö, Schlaghecken, & Meinecke, 2001; Sobieralska & Jaśkowski, 2005) .
Post-experimental debriefing revealed that this task was very difficult for participants. Many of them also admitted that they did not notice the distractor in the priming sequence in the first part (RT part). All data were included in the following reported analyses. For the analyses reported in the Appendix, we included only the data of those participants who detected the distractor at a level that was not significantly different from chance.
Reaction times
Mean RTs were shorter for compatible than for incompatible trials (388 vs. 453 ms), F(1, 17) = 210.2, p < .001. RT for neutral trials was 412 ms. RTs de-pended on SOA, being longer for shorter SOAs, Error rates (Fig. 1) were higher in incompatible than in compatible trials (11 vs. 3%), F(1, 17) = 26.6 p < .001.
The error rate for neutral trials was 5%. No other reliable main effect or interaction was found. 
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we tested whether bottom-up attentional capture by a salient distractor could provide a better account of the observed priming effects than top-down attentional capture by opposing their hypothetical effects. The results (RTs and error rates) are well in line with the view of top-down attentional capture, as responses were faster and more accurate for compatible than for incompatible prime displays.
Despite these clear effects, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that bottom-up attentional capture was involved, as it might modulate priming effects to some extent. In other words, the priming effect may be weaker when the target contains no unique features.
To further explore the possible contribution of bottomup attentional capture, we performed two additional experiments.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, the target display was preceded 
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. The intact square was defined 
Results
Identification
PCIs averaged across type of singleton, separately for compatible and incompatible trials, ranged from 41% to 80% (mean 57%) 4 . The correlation between the priming effect and PCI just failed to reach significance (r = .55, p = .06). As in Experiment 1, we included all data in our analyses. The pattern of results for participants whose prime identification was at chance level (see Appendix) did not substantially differ from the pattern of results obtained for all participants.
Reaction times
Responses were faster on compatible than on incompatible trials (317 vs. 370 ms), F(1, 11) = 142.6, p < .001. RT for neutral trials was 342 ms. Importantly, however, the priming effect depended on the type of singleton: RT(incompatible) -RT(compatible) = 66 vs. 38 ms; the interaction between compatibility and type of singleton was significant, F(1, 11) = 47.4, p < .001 (see Fig. 2 ). Separate analyses per type of singleton revealed that RTs on compatible trials were shorter than on incompatible trials, F(1, 11) = 152.3, p < .001; F(1, 11) = 84.3, p < .001 for relevant and irrelevant singletons, respectively. No further effects were significant.
Error rate was higher on incompatible than on compatible trials: 12 vs. 1%, F(1, 11) = 24.5, p < .001. Error rate for neutral trials was 2%. Mean error rate was also higher for irrelevant than for relevant singletons, 7 vs. 5%, F(1, 11) = 6.3, p < .05.
Importantly, the priming effect [PC(incompatible)-PC(compatible)] depended on the type of singleton;
Type of singleton x Compatibility: F(1, 11) = 18.5, p = .001. An additional ANOVA performed separately for both types of singleton revealed that the priming effect was significant for both types of singleton, but it was larger when the target-like singleton was displayed in the priming sequence, 14 vs. 0%, F(1, 11) = 30.0, p < .001, than when the irrelevant singleton was displayed (10 vs. 1%), F(1, 11) = 14.1, p < .05, respectively.
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 2, two different types of singleton (target-like vs. irrelevant) were inserted into the priming sequence. Both types were thought to be potentially about equally effective with regard to bottom-up attentional capture, whereas only one type of them was considered to hold the potential to capture attention in a top-down manner. Both types of singleton induced a priming effect, but the effect evoked by the irrelevant singleton was significantly smaller than the effect evoked by the target-like singleton (significant Type of singleton x Compatibility interaction). On the one hand, these results support the top-down view of attentional capture, as effects were largest for target-like singletons. However, as a compatibility effect was also found with the irrelevant singleton, these data additionally point to the contribution of bottom-up attentional capture. One might argue that the assumption that both types of singletons would induce a comparable capture effect is a matter of debate. Nevertheless, the data show that top-down attentional capture in itself is insufficient to account for the observed data. In other words, these data confirm that there is some contribution of bottom-up attentional capture.
One could argue that the priming effect evoked by the irrelevant singleton can be attributed to an extension of the target's definition (to squares with gaps in general). This issue will be considered in the General Discussion.
EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiment 3, the question under investigation 
Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2, but the assignment of target types was varied between participants. For approximately half of the participants, the square with gaps to the left and the right was defined as the target, whereas the square with gaps on top and bottom was defined as distractor, and for the other half of the participants, this assignment was reversed.
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2, except for the following changes. Both singletons appeared always in the same pair of the priming sequence 100 ms before the main stimulus (i.e., SOA = 100 ms) and both types of square occurred in the target display (Fig. 3) . The target display stimulus was presented for 154 ms. Sixty trials were presented for each of the three conditions, that is, neutral, compatible, and incompatible. 
Left: The sequence of stimuli used in Experiment 3, showing an example of an incompatible trial requiring a left hand reaction. Right: Reaction times and error rates in Experiment 3 as a function of compatibility.
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Results
Identification
Averaged across compatible and incompatible trials, PCIs ranged from 45% to 66%
5
. For seven participants, PCIs were higher than chance. The correlation between the priming effect and PCI was significant, r = 0.4, p < .05.
Reaction times
Responses were faster on compatible trials than on incompatible trials, 447 vs. 476 ms, F(1, 31) = 31.4, p < .001. Mean reaction time registered in the neutral condition was 462 ms (Fig. 3) . Target type factor was insignificant, F(1, 30) < 1.
A similar pattern of results was found for error rates. Errors were committed more often on incompatible than compatible trials, 7 vs. 4%, F(1, 31) = 21.9, p < .001. The error rate on neutral trials was 4%.
Discussion
In 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments were designed to determine the contributions of bottom-up and top-down attentional capture in the subliminal priming effect under conditions in which both types of attentional capture, either due to discontinuities or due to feature overlap with the target, may account for the observed results.
We focused on the paradigm employed by Jaśkowski et al. (2003) where the target display, consisting of two stimuli, one to the left and one to the right of fixation, was preceded by a sequence of four displays, which were made unrecognizable by metacontrast masking.
In One might raise the objection that the priming effect evoked by the irrelevant singleton in Experiment 2 can be attributed to an extension of the target's definition to squares with gaps in general. This would imply confusion of the irrelevant singleton with the target figure, http://www.ac-psych.org Blandyna Skalska, Piotr Jaśkowski, and Rob H. J. van Thus, in our opinion, the priming effect with irrelevant singletons in Experiment 2 should indeed be ascribed to bottom-up attentional capture.
In the introduction to this article, we indicated that the assumed relation between the DPS hypothesis and top-down attentional capture implies that attention is captured by stimuli resembling the target, thereby matching top-down action plans for features.
One might argue that this view implies that the locus of priming is at a pre-motoric level, and in this way deviates from the original proposal that free parameters of responses are specified. However, given the strong link that has been proposed between attention and the selection of action (e.g. Deubel & Schneider, 1996) , attentional selection may be considered as a kind of response selection. Obviously, this view emphasizes a role of attention in the control of actions rather than being vital for access to short term memory and consciousness, which is often implied by explanations for phenomena such as change blindness (Simons & Levin, 1997) . Moreover, the idea that topdown attentional capture would result in more conscious perception would clearly be at odds with the finding that primes are not consciously perceived (or are hardly consciously perceived). Clearly, specifying the level at which priming exerts its effect may provide important clues about the precise underlying mechanism. Based on our experiments, it may be concluded that top-down attentional capture only provides part of the answer.
With regard to the success of subliminal priming, metacontrast masking was not always as efficient as we expected. In some experiments, about half of the participants could identify or detect a masked object better than may be expected on the basis of chance.
Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that participants were aware of the primes to some extent. The high percent of correct identification or detection could be caused by strongly focused attention and perceptual learning during the PI part (especially in Experiment 1, where feedback about correctness was provided).
As mentioned earlier, there was, however, no reliable correlation between PCI level and priming effect in Experiment 1 and 2. The lack of a correlation between PCI and priming effect was also observed by Vorberg and coworkers (Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 2004) . These findings suggest that the observed priming effect is not due to awareness of the primes on a specific proportion of trials.
As mentioned in our introduction, a similar issue was investigated by Ansorge and Neumann (2005) .
In On the basis of our findings, it may be concluded that although DPS seems to be the main mechanism underlying priming, bottom-up attentional capture contributes to this phenomenon. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Ansorge and Neumann (2005) , who, despite considerable differences in the employed methods, came up with a highly comparable conclusion.
Notes
1 Obviously, participants' intentions may play a role when they are set for a specific singleton (Bacon & Egeth, 1994) .
2 An earlier examination of this issue was already reported by Ansorge and Neumann (2005) : they showed that attentional capture triggered in a bottom-up manner cannot be the exclusive mechanism for subliminal priming.
http://www.ac-psych.org lowing reasons. By means of the correctness feedback we wanted to keep the participants' motivation at a high level. This is especially important when the prime identification part is relatively long, as in Experiment 1 (double presentation of stimuli in all 160 trials).
This was no longer the case in Experiments 2 and 3. Moreover, we observed that correctness feedback remarkably improved the effectiveness of the participants' guessing through perceptual learning (see also Schubö et al., 2001; Sobieralska & Jaśkowski, 2005) .
This left us with the problem of not knowing whether participants saw primes in the RT part or learned quickly during the PI part. As already mentioned, the pattern of results in all three experiments was the same regardless of whether we analyzed data of all participants or only of those whose PCIs were not significantly higher than chance level. 
Appendix
Using a Chi-square test, we calculated the critical PCI for a given number of trials in the prime identification parts. This value determines if a given PCI was significantly higher than chance level (50%). These critical values were 71% in Experiment 1, and 60.9%
in Experiments 2 and 3. Percentages of correct identifications/detections (PCI) were calculated for each participant separately for each condition.
Selected results of Experiment 1
Only 10 out of 18 participants in Experiment 1 detected the irrelevant singleton at chance level in each of eight conditions. In the main text, all data of the 18 participants were presented together. Here, we report reaction times and error rates of these 10 participants.
As we mentioned earlier, the patterns of results for both analyses are similar. 
Selected results of Experiment 2
The data of six participants did not exceed chance level in the PI task. Again, the pattern of results is similar to the analysis reported in the main text in which all participants were included.
Responses were faster on compatible than on in- 
Selected results of Experiment 3
Twenty-five out of 32 participants of Experiment 3 identified the masked figure at a level that did not differ from chance. Here, we report reaction times and error rates of these 25 participants. As we mentioned earlier, patterns of results were similar to those reported in the main text.
